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The Australian electricity industry – like many other countries globally – is currently facing the complex
challenge of reforming electricity tariffs. Momentum is growing for transitioning residential consumers
toward more ‘cost-reﬂective’ pricing that better reﬂects the true costs of generation and supply, and
sends a ‘price signal’ that presumably incentivises reduced consumption during peak periods. Under such
tariffs, customers pay more for electricity used during times of peak demand – unlike traditional ‘ﬂat-
rate’ tariffs where the price remains stable regardless of time or demand. Pilot trials indicate that cost-
reﬂective tariffs might succeed in reducing peak demand, but often only for a small minority of custo-
mers, such that population-wide demand response is minimal or insigniﬁcant. In this paper, we apply
insights from psychology and behavioural economics to identify how cost-reﬂective pricing can be
designed, depicted and delivered to enhance customer uptake and optimal usage –thereby facilitating
‘appropriate’ demand response – for a larger cross-section of the population. By carefully considering the
likely impact of relevant cognitive biases and psychological factors –which routinely shape human
decision making and behaviour – we are able to propose practical strategies that industry can adopt to
maximise the prospect of cost-reﬂective pricing achieving signiﬁcant population-level peak demand
reductions, while providing shared beneﬁts for customers, retailers, networks and regulators alike.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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(footnote continued)
decision-making [15,16]. However, extensive research shows that consumer choi-
ces and actions often deviate systematically from such assumptions [17–19]. There
are various psychological anomalies and biases in human decision-making that
routinely lead consumers to behave in ways that traditional economic models
cannot explain, and this extends to the domain of residential electricity usage [20–
22]. More contemporary perspectives are increasingly integrative, taking into
account a range of socio-demographic, psychological and situational factors [for a
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Overinvestment in network infrastructure, falling electricity
consumption and (up until recent years) growing peak demand
are contributing to a challenging problem of network inefﬁciency
for Australian energy distribution and network service providers
(DNSPs). One of the signiﬁcant factors thought to perpetuate this
inefﬁciency problem is an imbalance between the ﬁnancial costs of
producing and supplying electricity, and the price actually paid by
customers. Regardless of demand on the electricity grid, many
residential customers are still on traditional ‘ﬂat-rate’ tariffs where
the price (per kilowatt hour of electricity used) remains stable over
time – essentially insulating them from moment-by-moment
ﬂuctuations in wholesale prices on the electricity market. One
potential solution to this disparity is to simply price electricity in
closer accordance with the actual costs incurred by DNSPs. By
doing so, customers are presented with a ‘price signal’ that more
accurately conveys the true costs of electricity generation and
supply and (at least in theory) incentivises them to reduce or shift
electricity usage to different (i.e., off-peak) times, thereby ﬂat-
tening peak demand. This pricing arrangement is commonly
termed cost-reﬂective pricing or dynamic pricing4.
The potential beneﬁts of cost-reﬂective pricing for reducing
the adverse impacts of peak demand have been promulgated
for decades [2–5]. Numerous pilot trials and ﬁeld experiments
have appeared to suggest that pricing electricity dynamically
(rather than statically) could yield a range of payoffs, includ-
ing substantial improvements in network efﬁciency, reduced
infrastructure costs, and lower average market prices [6–8].
Cost-reﬂective tariffs also are seen as a means of ensuring
greater social equity in the mass market, by reducing the lar-
gely invisible cross-subsidies embodied in ﬂat-rate tariffs. On
the face of it then, it would seem that tariff reform has the
potential to yield signiﬁcant beneﬁts for a range of stake-
holders. However, we are at pains to stress that this potential
is heavily contingent on the optimal uptake and usage of such
tariffs by a large proportion of the population. Indeed, some
critics have questioned whether a positive case even exists for
the large-scale introduction of cost-reﬂective pricing, with
doubts remaining over customer acceptance, adverse impacts
on vulnerable groups (e.g., low-income households), and its
overall efﬁcacy in producing the purported beneﬁts [9,10]. We
argue that, for cost-reﬂective pricing to yield the desired
outcomes for utilities and end-users alike, there are at least
two critically important and inextricably linked requirements:
ﬁrst, there must be sizeable and widespread uptake among
customers; and second, there must be optimal usage (i.e.,
appropriate demand response) that is sustained over time.
Identifying practical strategies to achieve both of these
requirements is the core focus of our paper.
The design of strategies to enhance uptake and optimal usage
of cost-reﬂective pricing naturally involves a deep under-
standing of consumer behaviour and the underlying psychology
of human decision making. There are numerous theories of
consumer behaviour and decision making available to guide our
thinking and practice in this regard, the best of which endea-
vour to integrate insights from multiple disciplines, including
psychology, sociology, marketing and economics5. Yet in4 Several different types of cost-reﬂective pricing have been cited in the lit-
erature, ranging from the simplest form of time-of-use (TOU), to more dynamic
forms of critical peak pricing (CPP), peak time rebate (PTR), variable peak pricing
(VPP) rates and real-time pricing (RTP) [for a recent overview, see [1]].
5 Most early approaches, such as classical and neoclassical theories of human
behaviour, drew on rational choice models [for overviews, see [11–14]] that assume
that consumers engage in economically rational information-processing andpractice, industry stakeholders often pay insufﬁcient attention
to (even entirely overlook) these ‘behavioural insights’, and
instead tend to pursue tariff reform guided by little other than
pure economic modelling. We propose that non-economic
factors are likely to also be inﬂuential – especially in this com-
plex and unfamiliar decision making scenario of choosing
among alternative electricity pricing offers. By considering a
more complete set of factors with the potential to shape cus-
tomer choices and actions – particularly psychological and
motivational inﬂuences – stakeholders would be better equip-
ped to understand, inﬂuence and predict how customers will
react to, and utilise new pricing schemes.2. Prior research and evidence: rates of customer uptake and
usage
Empirical evidence from real-world pricing trials shows that
the outcomes of cost-reﬂective pricing do not always meet
expectations. For example, if we conﬁne our assessment only to
empirical results from scientiﬁcally robust research (e.g., rando-
mised controlled trials, economic modelling of historical data), it
becomes clear that voluntary uptake rates are often low [29] and
in some cases only a small minority of customers exhibit demand
responsiveness [see 30,31]. Ultimately, these ﬁndings imply that
the beneﬁts observed in small-scale (often highly resource-
intensive) trials might not be obtained in large-scale roll-outs to
the broader population, because the latter invariably involves
diverse customer segments – each of which has unique needs,
wants, interests and motivations, and faces varying constraints
and supports when it comes to using electricity. A convincing
argument for the widespread introduction of cost-reﬂective tariffs
needs to offer something of value to the majority, if not totality of
customers. To this end, our paper endeavours to provide a suite of
practical strategies that policymakers and industry stakeholders
could employ to ensure that tariff reform is undertaken in a way
that minimises social, economic and political risks across
the board.
In terms of what we currently know about the initial uptake of
cost-reﬂective pricing, while there is surprisingly little data
available6, a recent review of trials conducted by nine U.S. utilities
indicates that voluntary recruitment rates for opt-in trials vary
widely across the lower end of the scale (5 to 28% for opt-in stu-
dies, with an unweighted average rate of 14%) and are often sig-
niﬁcantly less than expected (about 7% to 22% less than utilities’
predictions) [29]. Findings from recent large-scale experimental
work conducted in Australia [32] and the U.K. [33,34] also tend to
conﬁrm that the voluntary uptake of cost-reﬂective tariffs is likelyreview, see 23]. An exhaustive list of all relevant theories and models of energy
consumption behaviour is beyond the scope of this paper; however, some note-
worthy approaches include Van Raaij and Verhallens [24] behavioural model of
residential energy use; Costanzo et al. [25] socio-psychological model of energy
conservation behaviour; Stern and Oskamps [26] causal model of resource use, and
more recent approaches put forward by Abrahamse et al. [27] and Stern [28].
6 Very little information is available on uptake rates and the factors that might
inﬂuence uptake, because utilities are not actually required to report such data [For
more information, see [29]].
Table 1
Summary of decision-making principles and behavioural biases associated with cost-reﬂective pricing.
Barrier Description Behavioural economics-inspired solutions Key sources/
references
Aversion to complexity/ Tendency to adopt simpler decision rules (and
therefore potentially make worse decisions/choices)
as the information and stimuli in one’s environment
becomes more complex.
 Ensure simplicity (‘keep it short and simple’) in all cus-
tomer communication by avoiding unnecessary com-
plexity (i.e., present smaller amounts of the most impor-
tant information in a clear, concise and understandable
format).
 Simplify the registration process; design tariffs that are
more structured and less dynamic; and describe pricing
offers using straightforward, jargon-free language.
 Avoid inundating customers with too many different
choices. Instead, reduce the number of pricing offers to a
handful (i.e., fewer choices rather than many) and present
them side-by-side to facilitate relative comparisons.
[45–49]
Cognitive and choice
overload
Trust as a decision heuristic Tendency to use perceptions of trust as a decision-
making ‘heuristic’ – i.e., a mental shortcut or rule-of-
thumb to speed up information processing, problem-
solving and decision-making in complex and cogni-
tively demanding situations.
 Ensure messages stem from a source that customers
perceive as credible, trustworthy, competent, accountable,
and genuinely acting in good faith.
 Build customer trust in the speciﬁc entity (network pro-
vider, energy utility/retailer) that is seeking to introduce
cost-reﬂective pricing.
 Provide services that assist customers in managing their
electricity consumption, such as text/email alerts when
they may be approaching a certain percentage of their
previous bill value, and simplifying the content and pre-
sentation of bill statements.
[50–55]
Status quo bias Tendency to resist change and instead favour the
status quo or ‘default’ setting, which oftentimes
means not acting (i.e., inertia) or avoiding making a
decision altogether.
 Provide a ‘recommended’ or ‘popular’ pricing offer that is
framed as the default.
 Present traditional ﬂat-rate tariff in a neutral way by
presenting and depicting it in the same way as all other
options. It is less likely that customers will naturally
default to it.
 Capitalise on salient lifecycle ‘trigger points’ (e.g., moving
homes, contract end) when people may be more amen-
able to changing electricity plans. For example, customers
may be more willing to switch to cost-reﬂective pricing
when moving homes and/or changing electricity provi-
ders; when they have received a higher than normal
electricity bill and/or an electricity price rise has recently
been announced.
[56–62]
Loss aversion Tendency to focus more heavily on losses than on
comparable gains, and to exert far greater effort in
order to avoid a loss as compared to an equivalent-
sized gain.
 Emphasize the costs/losses incurred by sticking with the
status quo (ﬂat-rate pricing), and how such losses could
be avoided by switching to cost-reﬂective pricing.
 Reduce the perceived and actual ‘costs’ (e.g., loss of time,
effort, money, functionality, comfort, etc.) of switching
pricing plans by simplifying the registration/application
process, providing automated technology free of charge.
 To maximise the salience of a cost/loss, present it in iso-
lation by itself (e.g., “You are currently losing $50 per
quarter by staying on ﬂat-rate pricing”) rather than inte-
grating or embedding it within a larger amount.
 Design tariffs where the off-peak reduction in price (i.e.,
potential beneﬁt/gain) is greater than the peak increment
in price (i.e., potential cost/loss).
[18,60,63,64]
Risk aversion Tendency to prefer certainty over risk, especially
when the stakes are high – i.e., people are more
willing to choose a certain or guaranteed gain as
compared to gamble for an uncertain pay-out. While
risk-taking behaviour is more likely in the context of
losses, when the stakes are high, again, people are far
less likely to take a gamble and will instead prefer a
certain or guaranteed loss.
 Design ‘risk-free’ tariffs that provide an incentive (e.g., bill
rebate) for reduced demand, rather than relying solely on
disincentives (e.g., penalty charges) to encourage the
same behaviour.
 Offer an obligation and risk-free ‘introductory offer’ that
includes safeguards against higher bills for an initial
period of time – e.g., offer customers money-back guar-
antees or free bill protection insurance for a trial period.
 Offer an obligation- and risk-free ‘try before you buy’
period, so customers can trial cost-reﬂective pricing
without incurring any costs.
[64–69]
Time inconsistency and spa-
tial and temporal
discounting
Tendency to be short-sighted on nearby or immedi-
ate costs/beneﬁts and farsighted on costs/beneﬁts
that are further away or in the future – i.e., people
‘discount the future’ and prefer smaller immediate
rewards (e.g., $5 now) rather than larger future
rewards (e.g., $100 next year).
 Repackage the ‘costs’ of cost-reﬂective pricing so that the
beneﬁts are gained upfront. For example, make the
immediate beneﬁts (i.e., potential cost-savings) more
salient by communicating dollar savings in, or as close to,
real-time.
 Provide an initial period of ‘immediate feedback’ where
new customers receive real-time or next-day feedback on
the actual cost savings attained under different tariffs
(e.g., a side-by-side graph comparing bill costs under ﬂat-
rate vs. cost-reﬂective pricing).
 Minimise the time, effort, hassle and inconvenience of
switching pricing plans.
[70–74]
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Table 1 (continued )
Barrier Description Behavioural economics-inspired solutions Key sources/
references
 Provide hints and tips, as well as automated technology to
assist the customer in changing their energy-consuming
practices, especially long-standing habits.
 Emphasize the non-monetary beneﬁts of cost-reﬂective
pricing – e.g., improved supply/reliability of electricity,
reductions in peak demand, network optimization, etc.
Normative social inﬂuence Tendency to follow the behaviour of others, make
social comparisons, and adhere to social norms – i.e.
people are heavily inﬂuenced by how others think,
feel and act; they often care about performance,
possessions and wellbeing relative to other people,
rather than in absolute terms.
 Convey messages that encourage positive social norms
(i.e., provide examples of other households adopting the
desirable behaviour) rather than messages that encourage
negative social norms (i.e., don’t use examples of other
households engaging in undesirable behaviour)
 Where possible, appropriate and genuine (i.e., ethically
and professionally sound), frame cost-reﬂective pricing as
something that is common, valued, accepted and desired
among one’s local peer network/group, community or
society.
 Present a realistic image of the types of people who are
likely to beneﬁt from cost-reﬂective pricing.
[75–85]
Perceived fairness /inequality Tendency to be averse to inequalities and unjust
outcomes, and to seek fairness in one’s transactions.
 Provide hard evidence on the social equity beneﬁts of
cost-reﬂective pricing.
 Ensure vulnerable groups (e.g., working families on low-
income) are not unfairly disadvantaged by providing extra
supports – e.g. maintain the standard two-part tariff and/
or design a low-capacity ﬂat-rate tariff that is extremely
cheap, yet still sufﬁcient to maintain basic living stan-
dards; provide government concessions and assistance
programmes.
[86–88]
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examining whether customer participation depends on favourable
load patterns also seems to indicate that those customers who self-
select cost-reﬂective pricing are a unique subset of the population.
For example, some research indicates that willing customers tend
already to possess favourable demand proﬁles (i.e., they already
consume less electricity during peak times) [35–39] and/or demand
ﬂexibility (i.e., they have the ﬂexibility to modify demand by using
energy management systems or alternative sources of electricity)
[40]. However, some contrary evidence also exists suggesting, alter-
nately, that customers who willingly choose cost-reﬂective pricing do
not tend to have different patterns of consumption [40–42].
In terms of what we know about subsequent usage of cost-
reﬂective tariffs, recent empirical evidence (from two opt-out
trials with valid control group comparisons) indicates that
demand response is typically conﬁned to a small sub-sample of
the population [30,31]. The modelling of historical data to deter-
mine the price elasticity of demand for electricity also indicates
that the majority of the population are relatively price inelastic
(i.e., their electricity consumption is largely unresponsive to price
changes), with only a small proportion substantially price elastic
[43]. The fact that household electricity demand, in the aggregate,
appears to be relatively price inelastic is unsurprising, given that
the magnitude of elasticity is known to have fallen across the last
three decades [44]. This trend suggests that, overall, householders
have already made the bulk of possible reductions and substitu-
tions in electricity consumption (whether by behavioural means or
via the adoption of energy-efﬁcient technology/appliances).7 The ﬁrst survey of a nationally representative sample of people across the U.
K. found that 25% to 30% of people said that they were either strongly or moder-
ately in favour of switching to a cost-reﬂective tariff (either dynamic or static TOU,
respectively) if it was offered. The second experimental survey of a large sample of
Australian households found that likely rates of accepting a hypothetical cost-
reﬂective tariff offer ranged from 37% (for RTP) to 53–54% (for TOU, PTR and
CPP), or just 2.5% to 3.7% when adjusted for predicted response rate, in the absence
of additional risk relief mechanisms. It must be emphasised, however, that these
estimates are based on self-reported data only and do not reﬂect actual uptake rates.3. The current review: adopting a behavioural approach
On balance then, the best empirical evidence currently avail-
able suggests that initial uptake tends to be low, and subsequent
demand response tends to be conﬁned to a small and unique
segment of customers. Accordingly, we anticipate that from a
whole-of-population point of view, the beneﬁts of cost-reﬂective
pricing may often fall short of expectations. For new pricing
schemes to successfully achieve the desired peak demand reduc-
tions across the population, much more work needs to be under-
taken. Our paper takes an important step forward in this regard,
by introducing a different way of viewing the problem of cost-
reﬂective pricing. We draw on evidence-based insights from the
behavioural sciences that illustrate how consumers actually make
decisions and behavioural choices, and integrate these insights
with the limited empirical evidence available – conﬁning ourselves
only to scientiﬁcally robust research in the ﬁeld – to examine how
the uptake and usage of cost-reﬂective pricing might be improved.
Speciﬁcally, we (1) discuss a set of powerful cognitive biases
and psychological anomalies that are likely to inﬂuence customer
responses to electricity pricing, and (2) propose practical and cost-
effective solutions that address and/or leverage these inﬂuences to
yield optimal outcomes for both customers and the energy
industry. We will demonstrate that by understanding the relevant
behavioural forces and how they interact to shape consumer
choices and actions, we open up opportunities to effectively
capitalise on these forces to achieve outcomes beneﬁcial to all
stakeholders, consumers and industry alike. Table 1 summarises
the key psychological forces relevant to cost-reﬂective pricing,
alongside some behavioural economics-inspired solutions for
addressing and/or leveraging these forces.4. Human decision making and behavioural biases
In terms of strategies that might be effective for encouraging
uptake and optimal usage of cost-reﬂective pricing, it is often
9 This notion of managing the schedule of charges has also been reﬂected in
some qualitative research, which found that consumers typically do not fully
familiarise themselves with the precise implications of a tariff, but rather only note
that they are ﬁnancially better off using electricity during off-peak periods [105].
This suggests that consumers may rely on a rough time-based ‘rule of thumb’
(rather than conducting a fully ‘rational’ calculation of the price differential) when
endeavouring to understand and respond appropriately to a tariff’s ‘price signal’.
10 Striving for simplicity may not seem feasible for highly dynamic tariffs such
as real-time pricing. Such pricing is inherently complex and, frankly, not usually
designed with customer needs at the forefront. Yet even here, we think it is pos-
sible to design relatively simple, user-friendly cost-reﬂective pricing packages that
can achieve mutual beneﬁts for both utilities and end-users (e.g., imagine a cost-
reﬂective tariff combined with a complementary automated device that can
manage demand for the consumer, along with some simple visual aid that conveys
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and choice, and to become more actively involved and ‘engaged’
with the issue. However, this commonly-held assumption (that
greater information, knowledge and awareness will induce beha-
viour change) is inconsistent with several fundamental, well-
established principles of human decision making and behaviour.
These principles explain how people generally make behavioural
choices under real-world conditions (vs. the assumptions of classic
economic models), and more speciﬁcally, how people tend to
make decisions and act in ways that are economically ‘irrational’
(from the perspective of maximising personal gain) [19,89,90].
These ‘irrationalities’ –known as ‘cognitive and decision-making
biases’ –have been the subject of intensive scholarly inquiry for
decades, with research conﬁrming their existence across a range of
behavioural domains [91–93], including electricity usage [20–
22,94]. Many of these biases are simple mental ‘short-cuts’ or
‘heuristics’ that alleviate the need for intensive cognitive proces-
sing, thereby hastening the speed of decision making [95–98]. In a
world where information, choices and opportunities abound and
overwhelm, people come to rely on these short-cuts to guide their
decision making. It simply saves time, energy and thought, even
though it often leads to (economically) sub-optimal outcomes for
the individual.
4.1. Simplicity: an essential, overarching principle
Before discussing the various biases that might be implicated in
consumers’ responses to cost-reﬂective pricing, it is essential to
understand the overarching principle of simplicity that, when
properly attended to (for example, in programme design), can in
itself greatly reduce the expression of many common behavioural
biases. As intimated above, there are inescapable limits to human
capacity to process information, such that people tend to rely –
especially in environments of high complexity, uncertainty and
risk –on simple heuristics or other decision-making short-cuts
[95,97,98]. For example, when the amount or complexity of
information overwhelms, people often ‘satisﬁce’ rather than
‘optimize’ [15,16], i.e., they process only enough information to
reach a satisfactory decision rather than exhaustively weighing all
available information to achieve the optimal outcome. Further, as
the amount and/or complexity of information increases, people
tend to adopt increasingly simple rules-of-thumb, such as sticking
to the status quo [60,61], choosing the default option [48,56], or
avoiding decision making altogether [99]. Overall, there is an
abundance of studies conﬁrming that people tend to reach worse
decisions when given more information and/or greater choice, and
conversely, are better served by ‘keeping things simple’.
Thus, our overarching premise in any sensible strategy to
enhance customer decision making around cost-reﬂective pricing
is that customer behaviour will be heavily determined by the
simplicity of incoming information. In terms of cost-reﬂective
tariffs, new pricing schemes – as well as their enrolment pro-
cesses and the various ways in which the scheme is supported –
should ideally be designed, depicted and delivered in an exceed-
ingly simple manner. If overloaded with too much information, too
many choices and/or too much complexity, customers are likely to
ﬁnd it difﬁcult to select among options and instead, will tend to
satisﬁce and rely on heuristics (e.g., stick with the default option)
to guide their decision making. Thus, the number of pricing
options should be reduced to just a few, and presented in a rudi-
mentary fashion side-by-side to facilitate decision making8.8 Research suggests that decision making is improved when individuals are
presented with multiple options simultaneously, rather than separately [100–104].
A lack of comparison information in the latter scenario is thought to induce greater
reliance on decision making heuristics, which then leads to sub-optimal decisions.Additionally, if the pricing structure itself is too complicated,
customers are not only unlikely to choose it in the ﬁrst place, but
may also ﬁnd it difﬁcult to utilise effectively on a daily basis. They
may struggle to keep track of the changing schedule of fees in
order to know precisely when (and for how long) to reduce
demand9. Additional strategies such as prompts (e.g., text or email
reminders; energy orbs that glow green when energy use/prices
are modest and pulse red when energy use/prices are high [106])
and automated demand management technology are likely to be
needed to effectively support these types of schemes.
Simpler tariff conﬁgurations are bound to be more manageable
in everyday life10. Customers need only change a few electricity-
intensive practices, which may eventually create new habits and
merge into a new routine, further reducing effort. Both qualitative
and quantitative research indicate that customers often ﬁnd highly
complex, variable pricing schemes less appealing than simpler,
more static ones [32–34,107,108]. For example, an experimental
online survey in the U.K. revealed greater consumer willingness to
switch to static time-of-use pricing than dynamic pricing (where
prices ﬂuctuate based on the predicted demand and supply on the
grid), and greatest willingness to switch to a direct load control
tariff (where in return for a lower ﬂat rate tariff, the consumer
allows the electricity supplier to cycle their heating system off/on
at certain times) –which essentially does not require any beha-
vioural response at all [33,34]. Similarly in Australia, an experi-
mental mail-out survey of different (randomly assigned, hypo-
thetical) tariff offers found that self-reported consumer acceptance
was greater for more simple, structured and straightforward pri-
cing plans (such as time-of-use, critical peak pricing and peak time
rebate), and lower for those that were more complex, highly
dynamic and/or unfamiliar (such as real-time or capacity-based
pricing) [32]. According to the researchers, these relative tariff
preferences can be understood as “roughly reﬂecting public per-
ceptions both of how difﬁcult a proposed pricing structure is to
comprehend, and how hard it might be for households to behave
in ways that would maximise its beneﬁts” (p. 8).
While it is essential to always attend to this core principle of
simplicity, there are a number of additional strategies that can
either ameliorate or exploit those cognitive biases and other psy-
chological anomalies that tend to surface in all complex decision
making such as this. In the remainder of this paper, we explain
each of these potential inﬂuences in turn, speciﬁcally highlighting
how they might be leveraged to maximise both the uptake and
effective usage of cost-reﬂective pricing.information on shifting prices without requiring much cognitive effort). Consider
also that by offering simple solutions that better satisfy customers’ needs, utilities
might enjoy other indirect payoffs – greater trust and loyalty, improved reputation
and credibility, perhaps enhanced status as the ‘provider of choice’ – all of which
might presumably lead to greater customer retention and expansion of
market share.
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positive customer relationships
One overarching decision-making heuristic that is commonly
used to curtail cognitive processing – especially in the face of high
uncertainty, risk and complexity – is the perception of trust [50–
52,54,55]. In these kinds of situations, consumers often defer to
what their feelings ‘say’ regarding whether an entity (e.g., another
person, organisation, etc.) is trustworthy, as an indicator of whe-
ther the beneﬁts of a particular interaction/service/product are
likely to exceed the costs. In essence, perceptions of trust and
credibility become a simple barometer of ‘risk’. Given the strong
and pervasive inﬂuence of trust, we recommend that utilities
make genuine and substantial efforts to build customer trust and
conﬁdence well before introducing cost-reﬂective pricing. This
endeavour is not expected to be easy, given that consumers
around the globe tend to share the conviction that electricity
utilities are more interested in revenue and proﬁts than customer
welfare [109,110]. Nonetheless, it is absolutely essential that uti-
lities take up this challenge and engage in early, repeated efforts to
repair customer relationships and build a strong sense of customer
trust and loyalty.
For example, utilities could make serious efforts to provide
goods and/or services that help customers better manage their
electricity bills11, to always communicate in an open and trans-
parent manner, to partner with welfare organisations to assist
customers in need, and/or to participate in ‘public good’ type
activities that ‘give back’ to the community. Additionally, given
that price (and particularly perceived price unfairness) and billing
errors may have the potential to inﬂuence customer loyalty and
retention [87,111], and presumably trust, other potentially useful
strategies include ensuring that electricity bills are always fac-
tually correct, delivered on time, and free from ‘nasty surprises’
(e.g., higher-than-expected charges). For example, customers
could be alerted when they are approaching a certain self-selected
limit (e.g., dollar value, or proportion of previous bill value) to
ensure they have forewarning sufﬁcient to enable shifts in usage
behaviour before excess charges apply12. Billing information
should also be simple and transparent (e.g., providing clear rules
on how fees are calculated; date/s of metre readings at the prop-
erty). And in cases where over-charging and/or service failures
occur, the utility should issue a timely apology (ideally outlining
what caused the problem, and the steps taken to remedy the
problem and prevent it happening again [113]) and where
appropriate, provide fair compensation. Together, these trust-
building activities would help assure customers that the retailer
does care about their welfare, and the customer might eventually11 Some examples include: offering automated demand management devices
for high demand household appliances (e.g., air conditioning, swimming pool ﬁl-
tration, and electric hot water) to help consumers reduce or shift electricity con-
sumption during peak periods; and providing early-warning notiﬁcations (via
email, phone or in-home visual aid) when they are approaching a certain pre-
deﬁned level of usage.
12 It is important for new strategies such as this to be thoroughly piloted and
systematically evaluated ﬁrst to ensure no unintended consequences arise. To
illustrate, pre-payment of electricity is increasingly popular among consumers, yet
some evidence suggests householders who pre-pay (rather than post-pay), and
who pre-pay with smaller (rather than larger) top-up amounts, tend to consume
more electricity [112]. While this ﬁnding may be contrary to what one might expect
(given that such plans are designed to offer consumers more ﬂexibility in managing
their bills), it may be explained by the ways in which people categorise and per-
ceive costs of different values and at different levels of aggregation – smaller,
disaggregated expenditures might be seen as more trivial and less salient than
larger, aggregated ones (see Brutscher [112]).Whatever the underlying explanation,
this example illustrates the importance of pilot-testing new strategies prior to
broader scale roll-out, in order to properly assess all impacts, whether positive
or not.start to feel that their retailer has integrity and can indeed be
trusted.4.3. Status quo bias: present new tariff offers in ways that encourage
active consideration by customers
Another common anomaly in human decision making is the
status quo bias – a tendency to stick with one’s current position (or
the default option), which may often mean avoiding decision
making altogether and simply failing to act [60,61]. It is well-
known that people are inherently inertial and tend to resist
change. They usually prefer to retain the current state of affairs,
partly because any deviation from normality seems to pose risk
and potential loss, partly because it appears effortful and incon-
venient. In the energy domain, research has shown that customers
are generally reluctant to switch to new electricity suppliers, even
when there are material beneﬁts to be gained and/or they are well
aware of product and service characteristics [57,62]. Instead,
people tend to stick to the status quo. However, note that this
pervasive inertial tendency can sometimes be turned in favour of
change13 when the new pricing scheme is set as the default option
(because then the decision to explicitly reject the default is what
seems effortful and risky). Unsurprisingly, a recent review of cost-
reﬂective pricing programmes revealed relatively low rates of
recruitment (5 to 28%) for ‘opt-in’ pricing schemes (where the
default is non-enrolment in the programme), but substantially
higher rates (78% to 87%) for ‘opt-out’ schemes (where the
default is automatic programme enrolment) [29].
Collectively, these insights suggest that status quo bias is likely
to exert a powerful impact on customers’ response to the intro-
duction of cost-reﬂective pricing. It is reasonable to expect, for
instance, that many customers will demonstrate a deeply entren-
ched preference for the status quo (traditional ﬂat-rate tariffs)
because they perceive the potential risks/losses of abandoning
their familiar state and switching to a new pricing method
(including the potential inconvenience and cognitive effort
involved both in choosing and using the new tariff) as greater than
the likely beneﬁts/gains. Notwithstanding the potency of status
quo bias, there are several strategies that could be deployed to
lessen (or else exploit) its impact. As mentioned at the outset, it is
critically important ﬁrst to simplify information so that the average
consumer is able to understand and act upon it. Beyond those
fundamentals, other strategies include: (1) providing a ‘recom-
mended’ offer that is framed as the default14, (2) avoiding indi-
cating that the traditional (ﬂat-rate) tariff is favoured by the
majority of customers and instead endeavouring to present it on
an ‘even footing’ i.e., in neutral terms that should increase the
prospect that other kinds of pricing schemes are at least given
proper consideration, and (3) introducing cost-reﬂective pricing
offers at those times in a person’s life when they might naturally
be more open and amenable to considering alternative options13 However, it is crucial to note that this only means increased probability of
tariff acceptance, which does not necessarily translate into any increase in effective
usage of the new pricing scheme: a critical difference. Both logically and empiri-
cally, an opt-in (vs opt-out) scheme will see a greater proportion of its subscribers
willing and able to use the tariff effectively.
14 In regard to providing a ‘recommended’ pricing offer, Toh and Low [114]
reported on a smart metering trial with 400 customers in which 95% of participants
opted for time-of-use pricing when it was labelled as a ‘recommended offer’. The
recommendation was made possible by installing smart metres for a one-month
period in order to assess the customer’s consumption proﬁle and determine the
‘recommended offer’. It is unclear whether Toh and Low [114] included a control
group in this particular trial. Thus, it remains uncertain what the participation rate
would have been in the absence of labelling the pricing plan as a ‘recommended
offer’.
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about a high bill, or wanting to change plans for any other reason).
As noted earlier, status quo bias could also be exploited by
setting an ‘opt-out’ default pricing offer, rather than ‘opt-in’, with
the former likely to yield a higher ‘participation’ rate [see 29].
However, we caution that this strategy might create signiﬁcant
customer backlash, especially among those segments that struggle
to reduce or shift their electricity consumption appropriately. If
customers subjected in this way to an ‘opt-out’ cost-reﬂective
tariff failed to actively switch to a more familiar, less dynamic
pricing scheme, they might unwittingly run up markedly higher
electricity bills. Further, any change to pricing that impacts elec-
tricity affordability may pose health and safety risks for vulnerable
groups that might have limited capacity to respond ‘appropriately’
e.g., low-income households, the elderly, those with a disability.
Vulnerable customers may be induced to make choices that
compromise thermal comfort and wellbeing, e.g., not using fans or
air-conditioners during a heat wave in their attempts to avoid a
high bill [10]. Some researchers claim there is little empirical
evidence that cost-reﬂective pricing will ‘hurt’ low-income
households, e.g., Faruqui and Palmer [115] cite evidence they say
suggests most low-income customers would immediately save
money by switching to dynamic pricing. But the potential risks for
vulnerable groups cannot be easily dismissed. Thus, rather than
introducing cost-reﬂective pricing as an opt-out or mandatory
programme, we contend that a more socially responsible approach
would limit itself only to opt-in programmes, and direct con-
siderable efforts toward improving the design, promotion and
ongoing support of such programmes. At the very least, customers
should be explicitly informed about any impending opt-out tariff
changes before they are automatically enroled in them – and
provided with very prominent and exceedingly simple means to
un-enrol, if they so choose.
4.4. Loss aversion: reduce all costs associated with the shift to
dynamic pricing
Another prominent cognitive bias that may impact customer
acceptance of cost-reﬂective pricing is loss aversion, which
describes a tendency to place substantially greater weight on
losses than comparably-sized gains [60,64]. This persistent ten-
dency is manifest whenever people are weighing up the losses/
costs15 and gains/beneﬁts of different choices, and ultimately
reﬂects the fact that humans tend to experience or ‘feel the pain’
of losses far more than the pleasure of gains. This strong aversion
to loss has important implications for designing and delivering
policies and programmes intended to induce behaviour change,
including the framing of messages, the provision of options, and
the manner in which incentives are described and administered.
For example, many studies have found that loss-framed messages
tend to have greater behavioural impact than gain-framed mes-
sages, particularly when a self-referencing frame (emphasising
losses to oneself or the current generation) is used [116–119] 16.
The principle of loss aversion would suggest that messages
around cost-reﬂective pricing should ideally be framed in ways15 This may include ﬁnancial costs (howmuch does it cost?), physical risks (is it
safe?), social costs (what do others think?), ecological risks (is it environmentally
friendly?), time (will it take me longer?), functional risks (will it suit my lifestyle/
routine?) and even psychological costs (how will it make me feel?).
16 However, the motivational impact of a particular message frame may
depend on a number of factors – for example, the perceived risks of a target
behaviour, who/what is the reference point, and attributes of the target audience.
To achieve optimal effectiveness, factors such as these should be carefully con-
sidered when designing and delivering consumer-focused communications, parti-
cularly when tailoring messages to different customer segments [for a compre-
hensive summary, see [118]].that speciﬁcally focus on the losses, costs or risks (in terms of time,
effort, money, etc.) associated with retaining the status quo of ﬂat-
rate pricing or, conversely, convey how cost-reﬂective pricing may
help customers avoid losses, reduce costs, or minimise risks. This
is as opposed to simply focusing on the payoffs or beneﬁts to be
gained by switching from the status quo. For example, a statement
such as “You would lose $15 per quarter by not switching plans”
should be more motivating than “You would gain $15 per quarter by
switching plans”.
While these would be our general expectations – derived from
the convergence of relevant ﬁndings across many diverse domains
– in the speciﬁc domain of cost-reﬂective pricing, the evidence
seems less certain. To our knowledge, there has been only one
empirical examination of the relative effectiveness of loss- versus
gain-framing in the context of cost-reﬂective pricing. This work
found no signiﬁcant differences in the impact of advertisements
framed in terms of losses (e.g., “Not switching could cost you money
on your bill and harm the environment”) versus gains (e.g.,
“Switching could save you money on your bill and help the envir-
onment”) [33]. These scholars concluded that their counter-
intuitive result could be due to the loss-framed marketing mes-
sages not being strong enough to stimulate feelings of loss-
aversion17 in the context of such an important decision as whe-
ther to switch to a cost-reﬂective tariff. To ascertain whether tariff
design ‘trumps framing’ (p. 32-33) as suggested by the authors, we
would want to conduct further experimentation. These additional
studies would pointedly test the impact of advertisements free of
both loss- and gain-frame messages against those with loss- and
those with gain-framing. Only this would allow conﬁdent eva-
luation of whether tariff design truly overshadows the effects of
framing.
In addition to designing motivational messages that highlight
the avoidance of losses/costs, tangible efforts should also be made
to actually reduce the transaction costs of switching to, and using
cost-reﬂective pricing, particularly in terms of time, effort, func-
tionality and comfort. This might entail, for example, making the
registration process as quick, easy and hassle-free as possible;
offering automated demand management technology free of
charge; and ensuring customers do not have to sacriﬁce thermal
comfort or forgo valued lifestyle choices in order to switch
pricing plans.
Loss aversion also has important implications for the speciﬁc
conﬁguration of tariff charges. For example, Dutschke and Paetz
[107] found that participants typically preferred pricing pro-
grammes with a narrower spread of charges, which minimised the
risk of incurring the ﬁnancial loss of a high bill. It has also been
suggested that any price rises during peak periods (potential los-
ses) should ideally be compensated with much larger cost savings
during non-peak periods (potential gains) [120], which may help
alleviate any avoidance of new tariff offers for fear of incurring
higher fees. Furthermore, we expect that many customers are
aware that any increase in ﬁxed charges signiﬁcantly constrains
their ability to reduce bill costs, which contradicts the very ratio-
nale for trying out a novel tariff in the ﬁrst place. In fact, given
consumer awareness of those ‘uncontrollable’ ﬁxed charges, it may
even be the case they might be more accepting of, and compliant
with a cost-reﬂective pricing scheme that offers a reduction in
ﬁxed charges. Of course, we need further research to test this
empirically, with varying price differentials. But the general prin-
ciple in designing the schedule of charges in cost-reﬂective pricing
schemes is that any loss (i.e., increased costs, especially around17 Which, in this sample, were almost universal, with 95% of consumers being
classiﬁed as loss averse (and almost a third of the sample highly loss averse), as
measured via a standard battery of ‘loss aversion’ ﬁnancial decision-making
questions.
20 Although the outcome measure in this case rested on self-reported inten-
tions to take up a hypothetical tariff.
21 Note that this difference was only signiﬁcant for attitudes towards the tariff,
not for self-reported willingness to switch.
22 It is important to note that such preferences cannot be readily generalised,
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decreased costs during off-peak times)18.
4.5. Risk aversion: provide assurances that customers do not risk
higher electricity bills under cost-reﬂective pricing
Related to loss aversion is the tendency for people to be risk
averse. For example, people tend to over-weight certainty and sure
gains, favouring a smaller but guaranteed payoff over the gamble
of less certain gains of markedly higher value [64,65,69]. Inter-
estingly – and this may be of particular relevance to the content
and framing of different tariff offers – this risk aversion is more
prevalent in the domain of gains (e.g., people will over-value a
smaller but more certain gain compared to a larger yet uncertain
gain), whereas people tend to be somewhat more tolerant of risk
in the domain of losses (e.g., they might take a chance on an
uncertain loss in order to avoid a certain loss) [65,66].
These regularities in how decision-makers typically choose
between probabilistic alternatives involving a certain degree of
risk have important implications for understanding customer
responses to electricity tariffs, because different pricing options
appear to invoke different perceptions of risk and reward. Com-
pared to traditional ﬂat-rate pricing, for example, cost-reﬂective
pricing holds out the prospect of higher reward, but also higher
risk [115]. Especially if the pricing scheme is highly variable, it may
be difﬁcult to predict bill savings, and there is a (real or perceived)
risk that nothing will be gained. It seems the advantages of cost-
reﬂective pricing are not obvious to customers, with many either
sceptical there are gains to be had or simply not valuing the pur-
ported beneﬁts in the ﬁrst place [107,121]. While the most obvious
risk faced by customers when switching electricity tariffs is
ﬁnancial (i.e., the chance of higher bills), there may also be phy-
sical risks (e.g., sacriﬁcing health/comfort to save on bills), psy-
chological risks (e.g., feeling disappointment /regret over selecting
the ‘wrong’ tariff) and even functional and lifestyle risks (e.g.,
around the time/effort involved in switching plans, the incon-
venience and ‘hassle’ of trying to use tariffs effectively, lack of ‘ﬁt’
with one’s routine/lifestyle).
Choosing a new cost-reﬂective pricing plan might therefore be
considered an ‘uncertain loss’ gamble for customers. They might
avoid risk by opting for/sticking with a standard ﬂat-rate plan
where the loss is more predictable. Or they might be motivated to
move off a standard ﬂat-rate plan by tariffs that offer only the
prospect of gains without the risk of loss, e.g., a peak time rebate
schemes assuring customers that their bills will not increase. In
this regard, it is quite likely that peak time rebates – even if the
discounts are variable – would be much more popular than other
types of cost-reﬂective pricing that do not involve such discounts.
Note that the relative attractiveness of peak time rebates was seen
in pilot trials run by Baltimore Gas & Electric (BGE), whose cus-
tomers proved to be more satisﬁed with a specially-designed peak
time rebate scheme than with critical peak pricing [122] 19. BGE
has now rolled out the peak time rebate programme alone, and
expects all of its residential customers to be enroled by 2015.18 Of course, offsetting peak prices with much lower non-peak prices that
deliver real cost savings to consumers willing and able to respond ‘appropriately’
might materially damage a utility’s ‘bottom-line’, at least on the face of it. However,
a proper assessment of beneﬁts relative to costs must also take account of any
longer-term, indirect outcomes, such as customer satisfaction and retention, and
increased market share. Additionally, the utility would be expected ultimately to
beneﬁt from any resulting shift in demand that might consequently reduce, delay
or circumvent future infrastructure investments.
19 The rebate scheme – BGE’s ‘Smart Energy Rewards’ programme – in this case
also incorporated behavioural solutions, in the form of personalised energy saving
tips and timely feedback, delivered by OPower’s Behavioural Demand Response.There are other potentially effective means of reducing the
perceived risk of cost-reﬂective pricing. Extensive research has
assessed the impact of various risk-reduction strategies (‘risk
relievers’) on consumers’ purchasing decisions and behaviour,
particularly in online retail environments where the perception of
risk can often deter potential customers [123–125]. In this envir-
onment, strategies such as money-back guarantees, warranties
and free trials/samples may prove effective [126,127]. In regard to
cost-reﬂective pricing, it might likewise prove worthwhile offering
obligation-free trials and bill protection insurance for some initial
period, as a means of reducing perceived risk [6], and thereby
enhancing uptake. Recent empirical work speciﬁcally examining
the impact of money-back guarantees on intention to accept cost-
reﬂective pricing appears to support this proposition [32].
Further, Faruqui and Palmer [115] have suggested that the
perceived risks of cost-reﬂective pricing could be addressed by
introducing a pricing platform enabling customers to select (or
have recommended to them) a pricing plan based on their indi-
vidual tolerance of risk relative to reward. We would also recom-
mend including – as an integral part of such a scheme – at least
one completely ‘risk-free’ tariff (e.g., peak time rebate), where
customers face no risk of incurring a higher bill, only incentive
payments for reducing consumption during peak periods. Ideally,
such a scheme would also build in the provision of simple
demand-management tips, and the offer of automated demand
management devices and/or other aids to help householders
reduce consumption at higher-priced times.
With regard to the potential of automated demand manage-
ment devices as a risk-relieving mechanism, the limited ﬁeld trials
conducted to date do not seem to indicate that the offer of tech-
nology (e.g., in-home displays and programmable controllable
thermostats) signiﬁcantly increases uptake rates [29]. But other
consumer-based research offers some hope that automated devi-
ces do have the potential to boost uptake. These kinds of dis-
crepancies in results might be explained by differences in the
technology on offer. For example, Stenner and colleagues [32]
observed elevated uptake20 rates when the offer of a free load
control device was bundled with a tariff. Fell and colleagues
[33,34] also found that a smart thermostat made dynamic pricing
more attractive21 and that the best performing scheme was a
direct load tariff, which is essentially an entirely automated pro-
gramme: in return for a lower ﬂat rate tariff, the consumer allows
the electricity supplier to cycle their heating system on/off at
certain times. Qualitative research has shown that consumers talk
favourably about home energy automation systems and smart
appliances, in regard to how such technologies might ease the
burden of changing routines, and maintain householder comfort
[108]. Further, when already on a cost-reﬂective pricing plan,
consumers show a preference for enabling technology [107] 22,23.because acceptance of automated devices appears to be highly appliance-speciﬁc. It
seems to depend on how long a consumer is willing to delay use of the speciﬁc
appliance, something that varies considerably across appliances [128].
23 In addition to examining the likely uptake and usage of automated demand
management solutions, it is also critical to consider their overall economic viability.
For example, research examining the value of smart appliances (per se) has indi-
cated that their value is highly system-speciﬁc. And once costs are factored into the
equation, it appears that the proﬁt margin is very low, especially as the demand
side management capacity increases (because cost reductions do not increase
proportionally) [128]. While such research suggests diminishing marginal returns
from the mass-scale introduction of smart appliances, it is possible that their value
could be enhanced through future technological efﬁciencies (which might reduce
the cost of installation and replacement) and the inclusion of ‘intentional’ demand
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increase the salience of immediate beneﬁts from cost-reﬂective
pricing
Another cognitive bias to consider in the context of customer
uptake and usage of cost-reﬂective pricing is time inconsistency,
i.e., the tendency for people to be short-sighted when some costs
or beneﬁts are immediate, but farsighted when all costs and
beneﬁts are in the future [70,71]. People tend to discount things
that are further away in time (temporal discounting) and/or space
(spatial discounting), and conversely, place disproportionate
weight on things that are immediate and/or nearby. For example,
people often procrastinate over, delay or avoid actions that are
costly to perform in the short-term (e.g., outlaying time, effort and
money to purchase new energy-efﬁcient devices), even if they
might lead to signiﬁcantly larger payoffs in the long-term (e.g.,
markedly reduced electricity bills in the next few years). This
systematic bias is extensively documented in the literature. Far in
excess of reasonable discounting for the greater uncertainty
around future outcomes, people tend to value immediate rewards
(and dislike immediate costs) far more than they value future
rewards (and dislike future costs) [70–72,74].
In regard to cost-reﬂective pricing, there are several upfront
costs that may be immediately salient to customers. These include
‘learning costs’ [129] and ‘transaction’ costs [130], in this case: the
time and effort customers must invest to learn about new tariff
offerings, and about how to modify household energy usage
appropriately. There is also the immediate inconvenience incurred
by switching electricity plans, often referred to as ‘hassle costs’
[131]. Modifying one’s pattern of energy usage may, in turn, lead to
other ongoing costs such as losses in convenience, comfort and
cleanliness. In contrast, the main potential customer beneﬁt from
cost-reﬂective pricing (and this is by no means assured) is a lower
electricity bill, which arrives well into the future and might only
involve a small saving on each bill payment. As such, customers
may have a tendency to discount these potential longer-term
payoffs by placing a disproportionate emphasis on the
upfront costs.
In the mind of typical consumers, cost-reﬂective pricing likely
poses certain, salient and immediate costs (and the accrual of
unknown future costs) as against uncertain, potentially negligible
and delayed beneﬁts. In these circumstances, it is likely that cost-
beneﬁt appraisals (to the extent the typical consumer even
undertakes such calculations) will be heavily biased towards the
upfront costs, and customers may well judge that the costs are not
worth the beneﬁts. To achieve a more balanced appraisal, the
industry should consider more explicitly highlighting and making
more tangible the potential beneﬁts of cost-reﬂective pricing, and
reducing the (real and perceived) costs of participating. Costs and
beneﬁts could be restructured, so that the beneﬁts heavily out-
weigh the costs and/or are gained much sooner, e.g., increase the
salience of immediate beneﬁts by communicating dollar-value
savings in (or close to) real-time. For example, BGE’s ‘Smart
Energy Rewards’ programme provides same- or next-day com-
munication advising customers how much money they have
saved, compared to either their baseline, or peers’ consumption. At
the very least, a simple side-by-side graphical comparison of the
quarterly electricity bill under the alternative tariff plans (e.g.,
traditional ﬂat-rate versus new cost-reﬂective pricing structure)(footnote continued)
response (manual demand response by the consumer), the latter perhaps stimu-
lated by such things as cost-reﬂective pricing and non-pecuniary, behavioural
interventions. Research appears to indicate that optimal demand response is
achieved when automated demand management technology is coupled with cost-
reﬂective pricing [1].should be provided to customers, showing the exact amount of
money saved (or lost) over time. Customers can then evaluate for
themselves whether they wish to continue with the new pricing
scheme.
Finally, it is important to consider the beneﬁts that cost-
reﬂective pricing might provide not only to customers them-
selves (potential savings), but also to the community (restoring
fairness and equity), and to industry (reducing peak demand and
improving electricity supply/reliability). In this regard, we note
that Gyamﬁ and Krumdieck [132] found that when households
were asked to rate the relative importance of price, environment
(carbon reduction) and supply security (blackouts) as reasons for
reducing electricity demand, price and supply were judged simi-
larly important whereas environmental impacts (while also
important) were of lesser concern.
4.7. Normative social inﬂuence: describe how other customers have
experienced cost-reﬂective pricing
Another mental shortcut that people commonly use in decision
making is following the behaviour of others in similar situations,
i.e., conforming to social norms. Social norms, quite simply, convey
the explicit and/or implicit guidelines or behavioural expectations
within a group or society concerning what is normal/common
and/or desirable behaviour in that context [76,82,133]. Because
people tend to do what is socially approved (because it yields
social rewards) and/or popular (because it reﬂects effective or
adaptive behaviour) [83], social norms can exert a powerful impact
on attitudes and behaviour. Numerous studies in the energy
domain have found that simply conveying descriptive normative
information – e.g., personalised messages comparing one’s elec-
tricity consumption to a neighbourhood norm – can signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence customers’ energy usage [e.g., 80,134,135–138]. The
behavioural impact of such messages appears to be greatest when
norms are contextualised with personally relevant, meaningful or
localised information (e.g., referring to the norms in one’s
immediate surrounds [78]). While the general trend of adhering to
social norms is a well-observed phenomenon, other social inﬂu-
ence research has demonstrated that in some circumstances
people can actually be induced to deviate from the prevailing
social norm. For example, when provided with a positive image of
an alternative, favourable, yet non-normative behaviour, it appears
that people are sometimes willing to ‘stand out from the crowd’ in
order to be associated with the positive features of the ‘rare’
behaviour [139,140].
In regard to customer response to electricity pricing, the
powerful impact of social norms plus the moderating inﬂuence of
positive images together suggest that likely barriers to uptake of
cost-reﬂective pricing may include (1) a general customer per-
ception that few other people approve of and/or have accepted
this form of pricing themselves (i.e., if customers think that many
other people are not shifting to cost-reﬂective tariffs, for whatever
reason, they may be unlikely to do so too); and (2) a general
perception that customers who choose cost-reﬂective pricing must
be (for example) gullible, unintelligent, poor, risqué, ‘greenies’.
Conversely, if cost-reﬂective tariffs are seen as socially desirable
and popular, or (alternatively), as uncommon but associated with
positive features, then customers might be more likely to test out
this new method of pricing themselves. In general, the literature
suggests that peer reviews and customer testimonials from cred-
ible, trustworthy sources (e.g., positive word-of-mouth from
friends and family, celebrity endorsements, etc.) can serve as
effective ‘risk-relievers’ for consumers facing purchasing decisions,
as can making a product/service appear popular and/or something
that is socially approved [126,127,141].
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focused communication should be designed and delivered. To
increase the uptake of cost-reﬂective pricing, industry stake-
holders and/or policymakers should consider whether it is possi-
ble and appropriate (i.e., ethically and professionally sound) to
frame cost-reﬂective pricing as something that is valued and
accepted within the local peer group, community or society, and to
associate it with positive images of the types of people who choose
cost-reﬂective pricing. At the very least, information about the
experiences – good or bad – of real customers is something many
will use to make their own decisions about whether try cost-
reﬂective pricing themselves.
4.8. Perceived fairness: explain inequity in ﬂat-rate pricing, and how
cost-reﬂective pricing restores fairness
One ﬁnal factor that conceivably might impact customer
response to cost-reﬂective pricing is its perceived fairness and
equity compared to traditional ﬂat-rate tariffs. While industry
support for cost-reﬂective pricing is generally strong, there
remains a common public perception it is harmful and unfair24. In
particular, variable pricing is thought to harm ‘vulnerable groups’,
speciﬁcally, those segments of the community with limited capa-
city to reduce energy usage during peak times, e.g., low-income
households, those with disabilities or medical/health issues, shift
workers, and young families with many children. Yet advocates of
cost-reﬂective pricing counterargue that it is ﬂat -rate pricing that
is actually unfair, since customers that do not use much electricity
at peak times (‘ﬂat users’) essentially cross-subsidize those that do
(‘peaky users’). Considered in this light, pricing electricity in a
more cost-reﬂective way is said to be more equitable, with ‘peaky
users’ paying the appropriate premium for using electricity during
high-demand times. In support of this notion, Faruqui [6] has
conducted a modelling exercise to illustrate that ﬂat-rate charges
may actually be unfair for ‘ﬂat users’. Using a population of 10
million customers, he demonstrated that under the current (ﬂat-
rate) pricing, ‘ﬂat users’ incur a $10 loss per month whereas ‘peaky
users’ gain a $10 beneﬁt. His analysis showed, further, that the
beneﬁts of dynamic pricing for low-income households actually
outweigh the negative impacts, with the vast majority of low-
income households actually better off under dynamic pricing (e.g.,
he reports that 80% would beneﬁt even without any demand
response, while 92% would beneﬁt with modest demand
response).
It would appear that the controversy surrounding the relative
fairness (or otherwise) of cost-reﬂective pricing stems from
viewing the potential impacts at different levels of analysis. In the
aggregate, it would appear that there are more winners than
losers. But at lower levels of analysis, it is likely that distinct
customer cohorts could well be worse off: not just low-income24 In regard to the perception that cost-reﬂective pricing is unfair, we
acknowledge that ‘electricity usage’ has multiple dimensions beyond mere time
(i.e., apart from just when it is used). For example, there is also variability in the
geographical location (where the electricity is used), quantity (how much is used
overall), momentary demand (how much is used at any one time) and duration
(how long it is used for). Pricing electricity according to only one of these dimen-
sions could arguably be considered ‘unfair’. The fairest system might be one that
takes into account all these different facets of electricity usage that contribute to
the ﬁnal cost of generating and supplying electricity to the end user. In practice,
however, designing such a system could prove a difﬁcult feat. Current models of
cost-reﬂective pricing get part of the way there, by charging consumers for how
much electricity they use over a set period (quantity), as well as when they use it
(time). However, they obviously do not account for all dimensions. Integrating
elements of capacity pricing with traditional time-based tariffs (i.e., charging
consumers for momentary demand) may be seen as an even ‘fairer’ approach,
although the challenge lies in designing a tariff of this nature that is still relatively
simple, easy and manageable for consumers.households, but groups of customers with particular attributes
that limit their capacity to shift demand, such as working families
and those with certain health concerns. Considering the real
potential for these stratiﬁed negative impacts, cost-reﬂective pri-
cing should be designed and introduced in ways that clearly
prioritise the welfare of at-risk customers, for example, incorpor-
ating government concessions and assistance programmes,
specially-designed and targeted tariffs coupled with supporting
mechanisms, a highly subsidized retroﬁt programme to improve
household energy efﬁciency, and even the option to remain on a
traditional ﬂat-rate tariff25. It would also be socially responsible for
utilities to offer their customers basic energy-efﬁciency and
demand-management support (e.g., simple energy-saving tips,
access to automated devices and direct load control), with this
assistance perhaps bundled within special cost-reﬂective pricing
offers tailored to particularly vulnerable groups.
Beyond these additional mechanisms to support vulnerable
customers, it might also help to communicate simply and openly
the relative (un)fairness (at the aggregate level) of different
methods of pricing (although as for most communication/com-
munity education campaigns, we expect that only a modest por-
tion of the public would ultimately be interested in engaging with
this). The ﬁrst step in such an enterprise might entail simply
explaining how electricity is generated and supplied; the variable
demand for electricity across different customers, at different
times of the day and year; the inherent (and expensive) con-
straints in supply that are stressed at times of high demand, and
(consequently) why utilities are seeking to price electricity dif-
ferently. As prior research on retail price rises makes clear, it is
critically important to convey a positive (rather than negative, self-
interested) reason why prices need to change, since this under-
lying rationale is linked to customers’ perceptions of fairness, and
subsequent intentions to continue their patronage [142].
In terms of tariff conﬁgurations, consideration should be given
to the fairness of ‘capacity’ pricing schemes, which include a
charge for the actual volume of electricity being drawn from the
grid at any one point in time, instead of (or in addition to) a ﬁxed
network charge and/or usage charges. These novel pricing
schemes are often recommended as being among the best
mechanisms for redressing the purported unfairness inherent in
the way electricity is currently priced. Since consumers would pay
a set price per volume of electricity drawn from the grid at any one
point in a given period, ‘non-peaky’ customers would usually pay
less than ‘peaky’ ones. However, some might still consider this
pricing method unfair, on the grounds that generally non-peaky
users might end up being charged just as much as regularly peaky-
users, due to some unusual instance in which they happened to
consume a great deal of electricity at once, e.g., when entertaining
or hosting visitors. Thus, the purported fairness of capacity-style
schemes is not without dispute, and they would likely require the
thoughtful addition of features that could mitigate some of these
issues for a variety of household types.
It has also been suggested that capacity-based tariffs might be
especially difﬁcult to understand – being relatively complex and
unfamiliar to consumers, who are mostly accustomed to a
consumption-based method of pricing) [143] – and that a ‘targeted25 The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) has recommended a
review of energy concession schemes and assistance programmes to ensure these
appropriately target and support customers who are at risk of increased ﬁnancial
stress due to cost-reﬂective pricing (Power of Choice review). It should be noted
that as more and more customers switch to cost-reﬂective pricing, the cost
incurred by those who remain on standard ﬂat-rate pricing is likely to increase
because the per capita cost of servicing this smaller number of customers is higher.
Thus, it would be prudent to offer suitable support mechanisms to help vulnerable
customers eventually transition to cost-reﬂective pricing.
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help them understand demand charging [144]. While again, we
have modest expectations regarding the likely impact of these
kinds of community education campaigns, we imagine that any
such education efforts might usefully capitalise on analogical
reasoning, i.e., using a familiar example with a similar underlying
principle to help people understand a new situation. Prior research
has certainly shown that analogical reasoning can be an effective
means of improving decision-making [145,146]. Demand-pricing is
an unfamiliar concept in the context of electricity, but commonly
used in many other domains, such as transport (airfares, car
parking) and hospitality (cinema/theatre tickets, accommodation,
dining on public holidays). It is possible that framing capacity-
based tariffs in analogous ways – with reference to other indus-
tries where people pay a premiumwhen demand is greater and/or
operating costs are higher – could potentially lead to greater
consumer understanding and acceptance of this type of pricing
regime for electricity.
The power of analogy could also be used to design and depict
capacity-style tariffs in ways that imitate internet or mobile ser-
vice plans that cater to different lifestyles (e.g., $50/month low
user, couple-household, heavy entertainment packages). Indeed,
capacity pricing of electricity might even lend itself well to the
design of an extremely cheap ﬂat-rate tariff, with a very low
capacity just sufﬁcient to run a small number of essential appli-
ances (hot water system, lights, stove, etc.), e.g., $40/month for
1.5 kW capped demand, with unlimited consumption. This type of
tariff might appeal to low-income households that are already
using very little electricity at all times. In fact, it might even help
raise the living standards of those that are currently using even
less electricity than the capacity limit, as they would suddenly
have access to extra electricity for fairly rudimentary activities that
improve health, wellbeing and comfort (e.g., reading, bathing,
cooking fresh food). While such a tariff would need to be carefully
designed to ensure it remains fair and economically feasible, the
potential beneﬁts extend also to the utility. For instance, if this
type of pricing is as appealing as it is socially responsible, multiple
beneﬁts might accrue for the utility in terms of a larger customer
base, higher levels of trust, and less customer ‘churn’. We note
here that customers in general may be especially motivated to
learn about capacity pricing plans, given ‘ﬂat-rate bias’ [147]: their
well-known tendency (particularly for hedonistic services [148])
to prefer unlimited consumptionwith a ﬂat fee for service over per
unit pricing, and similarly, to favour tariffs with a relatively high
allowance independent of actual usage [147].5. Conclusions and recommendations
This article has examined a number of common cognitive bia-
ses and psychological inﬂuences that may shape consumer deci-
sion making and behaviour in regard to cost-reﬂective electricity
pricing. These ‘behavioural’ aspects are likely to be critically
important when designing and introducing new tariffs. Not only
do they explain why consumer uptake and usage of cost-reﬂective
pricing often falls short of expectations, they provide guidance on
how cost-reﬂective pricing can be designed, depicted and deliv-
ered to enhance customer uptake and promote optimal usage.
In this paper, we have discussed a number of behavioural
interventions that might usefully harness and leverage these well-
established biases in decision making. However, before such
interventions can be implemented effectively at scale, it is critical
that we ﬁrst empirically determine which of these solutions (or
what suite of solutions) would likely yield the greatest peak
demand reductions, at lowest cost, and with minimal unintended,
negative effects. To derive compelling evidence in this regard, westrongly recommend that such research employs a randomised
controlled trial (RCT) design: generally the optimal method for any
programme one intends ultimately to validate [149–152]. RCTs are
a scientiﬁcally robust and empirically defensible way of deter-
mining the precise extent and nature of the cause-and-effect
relationship existing between a particular intervention and its
intended outcome(s). This methodology allows one deﬁnitively to
determine the utility and overall cost-effectiveness of an inter-
vention (or policy choice) relative to business-as-usual and/or
alternative interventions (programmes or schemes).
We close with a number of speciﬁc recommendations for
effectively deploying RCTs to empirically test various strategies
relating to the uptake and usage of cost-reﬂective pricing. We
would suggest that stakeholders ﬁrst perform a sequential series
of smaller-scale RCTs in the ﬁeld, with randomly-selected, repre-
sentative samples of customers, all of whom should be equipped
with advanced metering infrastructure (to provide objective out-
come data on electricity demand). Each trial should be of sufﬁcient
duration to examine not just the immediate impact of an inter-
vention, but also its effects as the intervention is continued over
time (‘durability’) and once it is discontinued (‘persistence’) [for
more information on these different temporal effects, see
[153,154]. And while additional interaction with these customers
(beyond that involved in the behavioural intervention itself)
should be minimised throughout the experiment to reduce the
inﬂuence of participant reactance and so-called ‘demand char-
acteristics’ see [155–157], in some cases it might be useful to
undertake a brief end-of-experiment survey to collect information
on participants’ subjective experiences, along with any ideas for
improvement in further iterations of the behavioural intervention.
Ultimately, the RCT method could usefully be applied to test the
cost-effectiveness and mass scalability of many, if not all of the
solutions discussed in this paper. Additionally, the cyclical nature of
this applied experimental method, i.e., test-learn-adapt see [158]
would enable such strategies to be iteratively modiﬁed –and even
interwoven with other approaches – leading ultimately to the
identiﬁcation of optimal pricing solutions that could then, with
minimal risk, be rolled out en masse across the broader population.References
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